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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 20050005

Appellee/Plaintiff,
!

v.

(incarcerated)

MARTY JOE GALVAN,
Appellant/Defendant.

ARGUMENTS
L
MR. GALVAN IS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
THE BENEFIT OF HIS PLEA BARGAIN.
A. THE PROSECUTION HAS YET TO HONOR ITS OBLIGATION IN THE PLEA
BARGAIN.
The State contends that Mr. Galvan received the benefit of his plea bargain
because the prosecutor "cured" the breach of the plea agreement, which was inadvertent,
and because the trial court was not influenced by the prosecutor's recommendation which
originally breached the agreement. State's brief at 1-2 and 15, relying on State v. Smit
2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203.
Whether the prosecutor's breach was inadvertent, and whether the trial court was
influenced by the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement, are immaterial for several
reasons.
Our criminal justice system depends in large part on the continued functioning of

the plea bargaining process. As the Court explained in Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257 (1971),
The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the prosecutor
and the accused, sometimes loosely called "plea bargaining," is an
essential component of the administration ofjustice. Properly administered,
it is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a fullscale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply
by many times the number of judges and court facilities.
Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential
part of the process but a highly desirable part for many reasons. It leads to
prompt and largely final disposition of most criminal cases; it avoids much
of the corrosive impact of enforced idleness during pre-trial confinement
for those who are denied release pending trial; it protects the public from
those accused persons who are prone to continue criminal conduct even
while on pretrial release; and, by shortening the time between charge and
disposition, it enhances whatever may be the rehabilitative prospects of the
guilty when they are ultimately imprisoned.
Id. at 260-61.
Particularly given the importance of the continued functioning of the plea
bargaining process, it is essential that prosecutors honor their obligations and deliver the
inducements which prompt defendants to enter their pleas. The failure of one prosecutor
to communicate prosecutorial plea bargain obligations to another prosecutor does not
obviate the obligations in any way, and should not be excused or tolerated by the courts,
because whether they are inadvertent or intentional, breaches of plea agreements equally
undermine the fundamental fairness and voluntariness of guilty pleas induced by the
broken prosecutorial promises. See id. at 262 (finding that inadvertent nature of plea
bargain breach did not lessen its impact; even though trial judge indicated that he was not
influenced by the breach, Court found that prosecution was in a poor position to argue
that the breach was immaterial).
It is elementary that trial judges are not bound to follow sentencing
recommendations, e.g., kL, and whether or not a trial judge is influenced by a sentencing
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recommendation made in violation of a plea agreement is likewise immaterial, because it
was not the sentence that induced the defendant to enter the plea, and it is not the
sentence upon which the voluntariness of the plea rests - it was and is the prosecutor's
promise that matters. See id.
By comparing what Kelly Sheffield promised Mr. Galvan in exchange for the entry
of his guilty pleas1 with what Paul Parker delivered,2 this Court can readily recognize that
J

The written plea form provided:

At sentencing, the state recommends jail time on the Class A with
completion of CATS or a release to an intensive inpatient program. At the
end of successful probation, the state does not oppose a 76-3-402 reduction.
(R. 56-62).

At the plea hearing, counsel clarified:

Mr. Sheffield [the prosecutor] will also recommend at the time of
sentencing probation in this case, with some jail time, and a release to an
intensive inpatient program.
(R. 146 at 11).
2

Mr. Parker, stated:
I just noticed from the pre-sentence report, your Honor, some things that are
troubling. First of all, of course, is his history. It is long and extensive, and
it is very troubling for violence, the type of things that the defendant says
today, that it was just, you know, related to the alcohol.
But yet it is replete back from the early days in the mid 1980s - or,
1982, with assaulting type offenses, and it runs the gamut up to the felony,
which was an aggravated assault, apparently with a weapon. He has just
done this almost all of his adult life, and this is - this is very concerning,
particularly given the facts and the circumstances we have in this case.
Secondly, I am concerned with his ability to really do well on a
probation setting. I notice on the page that describes the probation history
he has not done well. He has had some difficulties. He has not complied,
and they've had to bring him back. I notice even under the criminal history,
where it talks about the jail disciplinaries, that he was remanded for
inciting, agitating other prisoners, using threatening and abusive language.
3

the prosecution's end of the plea bargain was not fulfilled.
It would undermine the integrity of the judiciary and the functioning of the plea
bargaining system if this Court were to accept the State's invitation to pretend otherwise.
Given what is at stake, ordering a simple sentencing hearing before a new judge,
and requiring the prosecution to honor its obligation to Mr. Galvan, is not too much to
ask.
As the Santobello Court recognized, there are certain safeguards which must attend
the entry of guilty pleas, to insure that the defendants receive their due. Id. at 262. The
Court recognized that while the facts of each case may vary, "a constant factor is that
when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor,
so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled." Id.
B. MR. GALVAN DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR.
The State argues that because trial counsel complained of the prosecutor's breach
of the plea agreement, and asked the trial court to sentence in accordance with the terms
of the plea agreement, Mr. Galvan should not be heard to complain of the error on appeal,

Again, these are not wonderful indications of an individual that
should be on probation, and it looks to me like he needs to be in prison, as
the pre-sentence report has indicated. We'll submit it, your Honor.
(R. 146 at 23-24).
After Mr. Galvan pled for leniency with the court, trial counsel for Galvan
approached for an unrecorded bench conference (R. 146 at 26). Following this, trial
counsel noted that the prosecutor, Paul Parker, had breached the plea agreement reached
between trial counsel and another prosecutor, Kelly Sheffield, after Mr. Sheffield had
failed to leave a note for Mr. Parker informing him of the plea agreement (R. 146 at 26).
Mr. Parker interjected to explain that the plea agreement was not in hisfile,and
that "to stable that agreement," he would withdraw his comments and "make an
affirmative recommendation of probation." (R. 146 at 27).
4

because he invited it. State's brief at 8-11.
Mr. Galvan had exactly nothing to do with the error which remains to be cured on
appeal - the prosecution's breach of the plea agreement. Mr. Galvan entered into and
honored his end of the plea agreement when he entered his pleas, which alleviated the
State's burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at trial (R. 56-62). He
did not cause the prosecution's breach of the plea agreement, and should not be held
accountable for that breach.
C MR. GALVAN DID NOT WAIVE THE ERROR.
The State claims that Galvan did not preserve below the issue he raises on appeal.
State's brief at 8-9.
Trial counsel did bring the relevant error to the trial court's attention when he
informed the court after an unrecorded bench conference that Mr. Parker had breached
the plea agreement (R. 146 at 26).
Assuming arguendo that what was said both on and off the record did not inform
the trial court of the error, present counsel for Galvan fully informed the court of the error
and the relevant law when she moved for correction of the error in the imposition of
Galvan's sentence (R. 84-114).
D. THE PLAIN ERROR AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES DOCTRINES
DO APPLY.
For the first time in its brief, the State raises the doctrines of plain error and
exceptional circumstances, claiming that these doctrines do not apply in this case. State's
brief at 11-16.
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in
5

hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e ^ , State v. Eldredge. 773 P.2d
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied. 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are
particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United
States v. Lindsay. 184F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th CirA cert, denied. 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999).
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving '"rare
procedural anomalies,'" as a '"safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v.
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, ^ 23, 94 P.3d 186.
Both of these doctrines apply in this case, where the error, the prosecutor's breach
of the plea agreement, is plain on the face of the record, and was expressly brought to the
trial court's attention by trial counsel at the time of the breach, and by present counsel at
the time the rule 22 motion wasfiled(see nn. 1 and 2, supra, and R. 146 at 26, 84-114).
Santobello was published for years, and had been relied on in sixteen Utah cases,
before Galvan's sentencing hearing on December 6, 2004. See, State v. Garfield. 552
P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1976); State v. Soper. 559 P.2d 951, 953 (Utah 1977); State v. Bero.
645 P.2d 44, 46 (Utah 1982); State v. Bennett. 657 P.2d 1353, 1354 and n.l (Utah 1983);
State v. Clark. 675 P.2d 557, 559 (Utah 1983); State v. Kay. 717 P.2d 1294,1302 (Utah
1986); State v. West. 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (concurring opinion, joined by
majority of court); State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266,1275-76 (Utah 1988); State v.
Thurston. 781 P.2d 1296,1299 (Utah 1999); State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety
Nine Dollars. U.S. Currency. 791 P.2d 213,216 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Pearson. 818
P.2d 581, 582 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Trover. 910 P.2d 1182,1193 (Utah 1995); State
v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021, 1026 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 396
(Utah App. 1997); State v. Gladnev. 951 P.2d 247, 248 (Utah App. 1998); and State v.
Smit. 2004 UT App 222, \ 9, 95 P.3d 1203.
Smit did not overrule and does not control over Santobello or the other Utah cases
6

applying this fundamental federal constitutional law requiring prosecutors to honor their
plea agreements, but held that one trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea on the facts of that case. Smit does not purport to set a
bright line rule for what other trial courts must do with other motions, such as the Rule 22
motion filed in the instant case. See id.
The error was prejudicial to Mr. Galvan, because it robbed him of the inducement
to enter his pleas to a third degree felony and a class A misdemeanor, and rendered the
pleas unknowing and involuntary. See n.l and Santobello, supra.
The prosecutor's breach of the plea bargain was a rare procedural anomaly - there
are very few Utah cases in which such claims have been raised. See generally, e.g.. State
v. Smit 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.3d 1203 (summarizing relevant Utah cases).
Assuming that the issue was not properly preserved, this Court can and should use
the safety device of the extraordinary circumstances doctrine to avoid the fundamental
unfairness or manifest injustice which occurred and remains until the prosecution fulfills
its end of the plea bargain. See Nelson-Waggoner, supra.
Because the sentence was imposed in a patently illegal manner, Utah R. Crim. P.
22 provides this Court with independent jurisdiction to correct the error, even if it was
never raised in the trial court. See, e ^ , State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 860 (Utah 1995)
(appellate courts have jurisdiction to correct patently illegal sentences under Rule 22,
regardless of whether errors were raised in the trial court).
II.
THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION
TO RULE ON THE 22(e) MOTION.
Having taken the position in the trial court that the trial court did have jurisdiction
to rule on the Rule 22(e) motion (R. 140), the State attempts to reverse its position on
7

appeal. State's brief at 16-20.
Because the State affirmatively waived in the trial court the position it asserts on
appeal, this Court need not address the State's contention on appeal. E.g., State v.
Hodges. 2002 UT 1171f 5, 63 P.3d 66.
The State contends that by filing the notice of appeal and subsequently filing a
docketing statement challenging the prosecution's breach of the plea agreement, Galvan
deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to rule on a Rule 22 motion raising the same
argument in that court. State's brief at 17.
While the State is correct that the filing of a notice of appeal often divests a trial
court of jurisdiction over non-collateral matters, ej*. Saunders v. Sharp. 818 P.2d 574,
577 (Utah App. 1991), Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(e) is very explicit in recognizing a
trial court's continuing jurisdiction to correct "a sentence imposed in an illegal manner"
"at any time." Id.
The State's reliance on State v. Clark, 913 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996), is
misplaced because that case turns on a radically different set of procedural facts than are
present here. In Clark, the defendant was sentenced and filed a notice of appeal, which
appeal he defaulted. Id. at 361 and n.l. The defendant then filed a motion in the trial
court to correct an illegal sentence under Rule 22. Id. The trial court denied that motion,
both on the merits, and because he had defaulted the appeal. Id. at 362. On appeal from
the denial of relief under Rule 22, the State contended that this Court should not address
the appeal, but should hold that the appeal was barred by the doctrine of res judicata on
the basis of the defaulted appeal. Id.
This Court held that the default dismissal of the appeal was a ruling on the merits
of the sentence, because the defendant did not seek to cure the default when given an
extension by this Court to do so, by filing a motion to reinstate the appeal, by filing a
8

petition for rehearing, or by filing a petition for certiorari. The Court suggested that while
the doctrine of res judicata barred the appeal from the denial of the rule 22 motion, the
defendant could proceed to raise the issue in the trial court in a post-conviction
proceeding. Id. at 363 and n.4.
In the instant matter, at the time of the filing of the Rule 22 motion, there was no
ruling on the merits by this Court, and Judge Kennedy did not rule that any such ruling by
this Court raised a res judicata bar to the Rule 22 motion. Thus, Clark is inapposite.
The rule in Utah, as reflected in Rule 22, is that trial courts have continuing
jurisdiction to correct illegal and illegally imposed sentences at any time. See id. and
State v. Babbel 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) (demonstrating that Utah, like most states,
recognizes continuing jurisdiction in trial courts to correct illegal sentences at any time,
regardless of appeal).
The State cites State v. Telford. 2002 UT 51,ffl[5-6 and n.l, 48 P.3d 228; and
State v. Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, ^ 15; for the proposition that a trial court's
jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence is narrow, and permits trial courts to correct
sentences only when they exceed the statutory range or when they are imposed by courts
lacking jurisdiction. State's brief at 18-19.
In Telford, the defendant tried to challenge his underlying conviction with a Rule
22(e) motion, but this Court did not permit it, because the issues raised did not pertain to
his sentence. Id.
In contrast, Mr. Galvan's claims go directly to the illegality which occurred in the
imposition of his sentence when the prosecutor, during sentencing, breached the promise
which induced Galvan's pleas.
In Thorkelson, the defendant raised challenges to his sentence which he had
presented to the trial court in a Rule 22 motion, claiming that the trial court was biased
9

against him and failed to consider mitigating evidence and necessary statutory factors
encompassed in a certain medical report. Id. at ^[ 11-14. The State claimed that this
Court had no jurisdiction on appeal because the claims were not properly raised in a Rule
22 motion, and this Court indicated that the jurisdictional question required the Court to
assess the merits of all of Thorkelson's claims regarding his sentence, to assess whether
the sentence was legal or not. Id. at % 10. After rejecting all of the claims on the merits
and finding that the sentence was lawful, id- atffl[11-14, the Court dismissed the appeal,
because the errors involved should have been raised on appeal, which the defendant
defaulted, and because the trial court did not have jurisdiction under Rule 22 to correct
the sentence, which was legal.
In the instant matter, the trial court did have jurisdiction to correct the illegal
imposition of Galvan's sentence under Rule 22, because the imposition of the sentence
was illegal by virtue of the prosecutor's breach of his plea obligations at sentencing. See
Point I, supra. Gal van did not default his appeal, but timely filed that appeal, and then
moved to consolidate it with the appeal from the trial court's denial of the Rule 22
motion.
Because Galvan's sentence was imposed in a patently illegal manner, see Point I,
and because Galvan did not default his appeal, Thorkelson does not control or deprive
this Court of jurisdiction.
In the event that the Rule 22 appeal is dismissed, Galvan's original appeal from the
imposition of sentence remains in place, permitting this Court to correct the error which
occurred in the imposition of his sentence. Compare Thorkelson, supra.
CONCLUSION
This Court should remand this to the trial court for resentencing in compliance
with the plea agreement before a new judge.
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Respectfully submitted on August 22, 2005
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